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Abstract
We investigate the relation between ownership structure and firm performance
in Continental Europe, using data from 675 publicly traded corporations in
11 countries. Although family-controlled corporations exhibit larger separation
between control and cash-flow rights, our results do not support the hypoth-
esis that family control hampers firm performance. Valuation and operating
performance are significantly higher in founder-controlled corporations and in
corporations controlled by descendants who sit on the board as non-executive
directors. When a descendant takes the position of CEO, family-controlled
companies are not statistically distinguishable from non-family firms in terms
of valuation and performance.
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1. Introduction
The effect of family control of public corporations is a growing field of interest in the
finance and management literature. In this paper we address the point by studying a
sample of 675 large public corporations in continental Europe.
We are grateful to Massimo Belcredi, Magda Bianco, Vincenzo Capizzi, Guido Corbetta,
Ettore Croci, Mara Faccio, David Hillier, Anete Pajuste, Belen Villalonga, Dariusz Wo´jcik,
and participants to the EFM Symposium on ‘Corporate Governance’ in Leeds (April
2005), to the EFA Annual Meeting in Moscow (August 2005), to the CEIS Symposium
in Roma-Tor Vergata University (December 2005) to the EIASM workshop on “Family
Firms Management Research” in Nice (June 2006), and to the conference on “Corporate
Governance in Family/Unlisted Firms” in Thun (June 2006) for stimulating comments. The
responsibility for any remaining errors rests fully with the authors. The research project has
been funded by MIUR, COFIN 2003.
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Family control of public corporations is considered with mixed feelings by European
public opinion. On one hand, it is respected because many large European companies
have prospered under the founding family for a long time, sometimes for centuries,
thereby accrediting the view that families are long-term investors committed to the
success of the firm they invest in. On the other hand, the different priorities that families
may have with respect to those of outside shareholders are seen as a potential for conflicts
of interest that may hinder value creation and the growth of European companies.
Families are clearly oriented to maintaining control of the companies they found or
acquire, and often resort to control-enhancing devices (dual-class shares, pyramid, etc.)
that several studies have proven to be associated with lower value-creation (Claessens
et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Gompers et al., 2004), and that many critics would like
to see banned by EC regulation (see the EC ‘High Level Group of Company Law
Experts’ report, also known as the Winter report, HLG, 2002 a,b). Families are often
accused of considering executive positions in the firm as a channel for providing highly-
remunerated jobs to the offspring, thereby depriving outside shareholders of the value-
creation potential that the selection of the best managers would provide.
Since family control can have both positive and negative properties, empirical
evidence is of paramount importance for judging its final effect and for orienting
regulation. Empirical literature about family control of public corporations has been
rather focused on the USA, starting from Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Morck et al.
(1989). After them, Denis and Denis (1994) study majority-owned firms, and find that
they do not exhibit specific inefficiency features although most of them are characterised
by family involvement. Many papers highlight that founder-CEOs have a positive effect
on corporate performance (McConnaughy et al., 1998; Palia and Ravid, 2002; Anderson
and Reeb, 2003; Adams et al., 2004; Fahlenbrach, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).
A critical event for family control is clearly the retirement of the founder coupled to the
‘passing of the baton’ to an heir.This often leads to a decline in the performance of the
firm (McConnaughy et al., 1998; Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; for
Canada, Morck et al., 2000). On balance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that family
ownership is an effective organisational structure in the USA while Villalonga and Amit
(2004) report that family control exhibits specific weaknesses when descendants are
involved in top management.
There is little comprehensive evidence concerning European corporations. The only
paper similar to ours is Maury (2006), who provides results that are close to those we re-
port in Section 4A, while the results of single-country studies (Gorton and Schmid, 2000;
Volpin, 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Sraer and Thesmar, 2004; Hillier and McCol-
gan, 2004; Ehrhardt et al., 2006) give rise to a contrasted picture about the effect of family
control. To our knowledge, our paper is the first one to document the consequences of
family control at the founder and descendants stage across continental Europe.
The evidence we obtain sheds light on a positive association of family control with
market valuation and operating performance. The intriguing feature of our results is
that families are the type of owners that most often resort to control-enhancing devices
associated with lower performance, yet there is no evidence that family control is
negative for firm value and operating performance. If we consider both family affiliation
and the percentage of cash-flow and voting rights held by the largest shareholder, the
effect of family control is positive, suggesting that for any given cash-flow/voting rights
combination, families tend to be better than other types of controlling shareholders.
If we put together the effect of family control with the ownership structure chosen
by families, we find that part of the positive effect is wasted by the over use of
C© 2006 The Authors
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wealth-reducing control-enhancing devices, but a residual positive effect is clearly still
there. Thus, our results provide a contribution to the existing literature by warning that
the simple observation of the over use of control-enhancing devices by family firms
does not imply a global negative effect of family control, as is often assumed.
We then move to consider what happens to family firms’ performance when the
company is still run by its founder or by the descendants, and what is the role that
founders and/or descendents take up in the corporation. We find a confirmation of the
non-European results on the positive effect of founders. However, there is no evidence
at all that descendant-controlled corporations underperform non-family firms. On the
contrary, family firms remain better than non-family ones when descendants limit
themselves to the role of non-executive directors, and are not worse than non-family
firms when a descendant takes the helm.
2. Sample Selection and Data
A. Sample selection
Faccio and Lang (2002), in their study on ownership structure in Western Europe, analyse
a sample of 5,547 Worldscope corporations, roughly corresponding to the universe
of stock market listed corporations in 13 countries. We consider only non-financial
(SIC 6000–6999) and non-regulated (SIC 4900–4999) corporations in continental
Western European countries. We exclude Ireland and the UK because their corporations
are commonly considered to follow a different – ‘anglo-saxon’ and more ‘shareholder-
value-oriented’ – style of management, and Faccio and Lang show in these two countries
family control is less important than in Continental Europe. Therefore, we select
corporations from 11 countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland).1 This leaves us with 2,631
Worldscope corporations. Given the amount of data needed for the present study, we
focus our attention on relatively larger companies – with assets worth more than €300
million as of the end of year 1999 – on the assumption that more information can be
found for them at reasonable cost. After this, we are left with 853 corporations that
become 675 after excluding companies in which the largest shareholder holds more
than 95% of the share capital, limited liability partnerships, and dual class corporations
in which only one class is publicly traded.
In Table 1 we present the number of corporations in the sample by year, country and
industry (using Campbell’s (1996) classification of industries). The 675 corporations in
1999 decrease to 640 in 2000 and 606 in 2001 because of mergers, privatisations and
bankruptcies. The breakdown by countries shows that the largest number of corporations
belong to France (144 in 1999, or 21.3% of the total) and not to Germany (119, 17.5%),
by far the largest economy of the area. Three countries, the Netherlands, Italy and
Switzerland, weigh in the sample around 10%, the others around 5%.
1 Of the continental Western European countries, we do not consider Austria, Greece,
Luxemburg and Portugal. For Austria, Luxemburg and Portugal, preliminary research showed
that inclusion would have increased the sample size to a negligible extent. We included
corporations of Greece at an early stage of the research, but we realised that during the
period covered by the study this country’s firms experienced a major change in accounting
rules, which made comparison difficult.
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Finally, the breakdown of the corporations by industries shows a fairly widespread
distribution. Basic industry (14.3%), consumer durables (12.2%) and capital goods
(11.5%) are the most represented industries.
B. The construction of the dataset
Given the objectives of the paper, we can divide the variables forming the dataset in
three groups; i) ownership, ii) valuation and iii) control variables. The measures of these
variables are collected for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.
i. Ownership variables. The identity of the ultimate largest shareholder and the size
of its cash-flow and voting rights are detected according to the standard methodology
developed by La Porta et al. (1999), and followed by Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and
Lang (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), to whom we refer for a more in-depth description.
To do this, we work on (1) official registers held by stock market authorities, and
(2) information disclosed by the corporations, either in the ‘investor relation’ section
of their websites, or in their annual reports. If we find all the information needed
in (1) or (2) we end the search for data about ownership. Other reliable sources of
information were considered (3) Worldscope, Extel and Osiris, (4) information contained
in the various national annual directories of listed companies published privately, (5)
information contained in the financial press, that we obtain both through Lexis-Nexis and
web-search engines. For sources 3–5 we considered the information valid if confirmed
by two different sources. In Appendix A we make a list of sources used by country.
The starting point for the ownership variables are thus the Direct voting rights and
Direct cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholders,2 which are two different figures
in the case of a share capital structure departing from one share/one vote.3 We then trace
the map of the ownership of the stakes, in order to identify the ultimate shareholders and
their ultimate ownership of voting rights and cash-flow rights. Therefore, the Ultimate
cash-flow rights are those held by the largest shareholder after taking into account the
whole chain of control4 (if family A owns 50% of direct cash-flows of B and B owns
40% of direct cash-flows of C, family A owns ultimately 50%∗40% = 20% of cash-flows
of C) and Ultimate voting rights are the voting rights held in the weakest link of the
control chain. 10% is the cut off point for the existence of a control chain, in the sense
that a listed company that has no shareholder larger than 10% is considered widely held
and therefore not controlled (however, it can be the apex of a control chain).
We collect from the above mentioned sources some additional information about
corporate governance, concerning: the size and composition of the board,5 with a
separate indication of executive and non-executive directors; the number of members of
2 The detail of mandatory disclosure about the minimum size of shareholdings varies between
2% and 5% across countries. We collect the largest three available, whatever the national
regulation. In doing this, we sum up the direct shareholdings pertaining to a single ultimate
owner, even if they are held through different juridical subjects.
3 We take into account the special case of France, where it is possible for ‘stable’ shareholders
to obtain two votes for each share held. We collect the information about double votes from
annual reports.
4 We also consider multiple control chains and cross-holdings in the sense defined by Faccio
and Lang (2002).
5 Or of the two boards, in countries where dual boards are mandatory (Germany and the
Netherlands) or eligible (Finland and France).
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the board belonging to the controlling family, when there is one; in this case, whether
the founder is still alive and has a role on the board, or the family members controlling
the company have to be classified as descendants. To obtain the latter variable we
have to perform a particularly careful scrutiny of the documentation supplied by family
companies on their websites, and of information available through the press.
ii. Valuation variables. The valuation and operating performance variables we employ
are Tobin’s Q and the accounting Return on Assets (ROA) measured at the end of 1999,
2000 and 2001.
As for the measure of Tobin’s Q, we start from the usual ratio between (Book value of
total assets – Book value of shareholders’ equity + Market value of shareholders’
equity) and (Book value of total assets). However, we observe that in our sample
full consolidation of the financial statements of controlled companies is the norm.
Therefore, to correct for the underestimation of Tobin’s Q induced by valuation of
‘minority interests’ at their book value, we multiply the book value of this item by the
market-to-book multiple of the company’s ‘shareholders’ equity’.
ROA is defined as the ratio between ‘operating profit’ and ‘total assets’ (both
variables are taken as supplied by Worldscope), but we deduct from ‘total assets’,
for consistency, the two items ‘cash and short-term investments’ and ‘investment in
associated companies’.
iii. Control variables. In regression analysis we employ the following control variables
that are standard in the literature: the Industry in which each firm operates (two-digit
SIC code); the Size of the corporation, measured by total assets (in the regressions, the
logarithm of); a Growth variable, the percentage increase in sales in the previous year;
and Leverage, defined as the book value of total financial debt divided by the book
value of equity at the end of each year.
3. Descriptive Statistics
In this section we present descriptive statistics for the variables we employ in the
regression analysis discussed in the following Section 4. In part A we focus on the
concentration of voting rights and cash-flow rights, and in part B on the descriptive
evidence of family control.
A. Ownership concentration
In Table 2 we present descriptive statistics for some of the variables of most interest
by country (data for year 1999). In the upper part of the table we present the average
and median values of the ultimate voting and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder
in the 675 companies (1999). In line with Barca and Becht (2001) and Faccio and
Lang (2002), European companies exhibit ownership patterns that are among the most
concentrated in the world, even after discarding the smallest caps as we do: in our total
sample half of the companies have a shareholder with more than 37% of the ultimate
voting rights.
The difference between the share of voting and cash-flow rights of the largest
shareholder, arising from both dual-class shares and pyramiding, is also relevant though
not huge (the median is 8.5%).
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In the table we also present the proportions of companies by the various types of
largest shareholder. Families are by far the most frequent largest shareholder (52.3%),
followed by widely held corporations6(16.9%), financial institutions (15%), the State
(8%), and other entities (6.9%).
B. Family control
In Table 3 we present summary statistics about the type of largest shareholder (Panel A),
and about the involvement in the corporations of families (Panels B and C). In Panel A,
corporations are grouped into the five traditional categories Widely held, Family, State,
Financial and Other. We have already observed the prevalence of family as the largest
shareholder, this is clearly visible in the first column of Table 3.
In the second and third column, average Tobin’s Q and ROA for each class are
presented. No clear pattern emerges from their observation, and we can anticipate that
some of the inferences that could be suggested by these first figures are not confirmed
by the regression results. More relevant is actually the evidence about the average size
of the corporations across the different groups, where it is clear that family control is
more diffused in comparatively smaller firms.
The remaining columns are about the degree of separation between control and
ownership across the different groups. Family- and state-controlled firms are those
where the largest shareholder invests more, on average more than one third of the total
shareholder capital in terms of ultimate cash-flow rights. But, what better distinguishes
family corporations is their larger wedge between voting and cash-flow rights, higher
than 10%. Actually, for the majority of the family corporations in our sample (close to
57% of them) we find that some control-enhancing device is in place.
In Panels B and C of Table 3 we present descriptive statistics about the involvement
of families in the management of corporations. Beginning from now, we refer to the
strict definition of family firm that we shall employ in the regression analysis presented
in the following sections. By this definition, it is not enough that the largest shareholder
at the 10% cut-off is a family (this is the only requirement for inclusion in the group of
355 family-controlled corporations in Panel A) but it must also be true that either the
family controls more than 51% of direct voting rights, or controls more than the double
the direct voting rights of the second largest shareholder. We employ this definition to
obtain clearer evidence about the possible negative effect of family control, often echoed
in popular opinion in Europe, because we realise that in several corporations a family is
actually the largest shareholder with more than 10% voting rights, but that there are one
or more other shareholders (usually banks or the State) with similarly large holdings.
We conclude that such corporations may be thought of as controlled by a coalition more
than by the family. In order to obtain a clearer response to the question whether family
control is negative, indifferent or positive for European corporation, we resort to the
strict definition of family control we have just described, in which the controlling power
of the family through the voting rights held cannot be denied. This leads to the count
of 314 family-controlled corporations we find in panels B and C, instead of the 355
reported in Panel A.
6 In this group we include both widely-held corporations and corporations controlled by
widely-held ones.
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In Panel B we can observe that in nearly 35% of the 314 corporations the CEO is
a member of the family; in half of them the CEO is not a member of the controlling
family, but at least one member of the family sits on the board of directors;7 in just
15% the family does not sit on the board at all. Average valuation and performance
measures between corporations with family CEO and family-non-executives are quite
similar, but Tobin’s Q is lower for corporations in which the family stays outside of the
board. The average family-CEO corporation is smaller. The percentage of corporations
that are controlled through control-enhancing devices is quite similar across the three
types. However, the average size of the wedge between voting and cash-flow rights is
smaller for family-CEO corporations.
In Panel C we split the sample by founder8 and descendants corporations. Founder-
controlled firms are 92 out of 295,9 or about 32% of family corporations. In more
than half of them the founder is also the CEO, and in about 40% the founder is a
non-executive director (but then, it is not rare for the CEO to be another member of
the family). In descendants-corporations the proportion between top-management and
board-level family participation reverses. In little more than 25% of them the CEO is a
member of the family, while one or more members of the family take a non-executive
position on the board in about 55%.
Founder corporations are better off in terms of average Tobin’s Q and operating
performance. Founder corporations also exhibit a more concentrated ownership and
far less separation between voting and cash-flow rights. This can be seen both in the
percentage of corporations without such separation (52% in founder-corporations and
36% in descendants-corporations), and in the average wedge, that is clearly higher in
descendants-corporations.
4. The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance
We can now move to the core of the paper, i.e. the analysis of the relation between
market valuation (Tobin’s Q) and operating performance (ROA) on one side, and the
variables representing ownership concentration and family control, on the other side.
7 Often being its non-executive chairman (it happens in 49.3% of the corporations in which
the CEO is not from the family, but at least one non-executive is).
8 We have to explain what we mean by the term ‘founder’. The simplest case is the one of
a corporation whose founder is still alive (and, obviously, has voting-right control, alone or
together with other members of his family). However, we consider a corporation founder-
controlled also when it is controlled by another corporation that, in its turn, is controlled
by its own founder. Finally, we consider founder-controlled a corporation controlled by an
individual that did not found it, but took control of it without being a descendant of the
previous controlling family (an illustrious example is that of Mr. Arnault, who became the
controlling shareholder of the Dior-LVMH group without belonging to the founding family).
We consider this individual as the founder of a new family dynasty. Consistently, we also
consider descendants, the descendants of someone that took control of a corporation without
being its founder.
9 We refer to a total of 295, because for two of the 314 family-controlled corporations we
are missing information about the composition of the board of directors, and for a further
17 we were not able to conclude whether the corporation is still run by the founder or by his
descendants.
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The general form for the regressions is:
Firm performanceit = a + b(family firmit) + c(ownership variablesit )
+ d(control variablesit ) + e(two digit SIC code dummy
variables) + f(year dummy variable) + g(country dummy
variables) + εi t
where
Firm performance Tobin’s Q (natural logarithm of) and ROA;
Family firm binary variable that equals one when a corporation is
controlled by a family10 and zero otherwise; in various
regressions we use more binary variables identifying dif-
ferent types of involvement of families in management;
Ownership variables a vector composed of the share of ultimate cash-flow
rights and the difference between share of voting and
share of cash-flow rights (wedge); in some regression
specifications this will be omitted11;
Control variables a vector of variables composed of total assets (natural
logarithm of), leverage (book value of total financial debt
/ book value of equity), sales growth in the previous year;
Two-digit SIC code dummy dummy variables that capture industry fixed effects;
Year dummy variables dummy variables that capture year fixed effects;
Country dummy variables dummy variables that capture country fixed effects.
A problem we encounter is the presence of outliers in the dependent variables,
especially in Tobin’s Q. In the years 1999–2001 the stock market conditions produce a
number of very high Tobin’s Qs that are larger than in previous studies (for instance,
the average Tobin’s Q is 4.22 for unregulated utility firms). Although we use the natural
logarithm of Tobin’s Q in order to limit the impact of skewness, we note that some
extreme values of ln(Q) could still affect the results in a significant way. We deal with
this problem by applying a winsorising procedure that censors Tobin’s Q at the 5th
and 95th percentiles by setting extreme values to the 5th and 95th percentile values,
respectively.
In the following section we examine the general relation between corporate perfor-
mance, ownership concentration and family control.
A. Corporation performance and family control
In Table 4 we report the outcome of two different regression specifications in which the
independent variable of main interest is the dummy for family control.
In the first specification (columns 1 and 3), that we can define ‘gross-of-the-
controlling-strategy’, we do not include in the regressors the share of ultimate cash-flow
rights and the difference between the share of voting and cash-flow rights. If value and
operating performance are correlated both to the type of the controlling shareholder
10 We employ the strict definition of family control that brings to 314 family-controlled
corporations, as we explain in section II.B.
11 We also test, but do not report, specifications in which we control for the non-linear effects
of the share of cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder. The results of these specifications
do not introduce relevant changes in the relation between value and performance and family
control.
C© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation C© 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006
702 Roberto Barontini and Lorenzo Caprio
Table 4
The results of regressions of firm valuation and performance on ownership concentration and
family control
In this table we report the results of OLS regressions, with dependent variables Tobin’s Q and ROA, for
the years 1999–2001. Family is a dummy variable taking value 1 for family-controlled corporations.
Cash-flow rights is the share of cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder. Wedge is the difference
between the share of voting and cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder. Ln (Size) is the natural
logarithm of total assets. Leverage is the book value of total financial debt divided by the book value
of equity. Sales growth is the growth of sales in the previous year. We include among the regressors
the fixed effects for SIC two digits, years, and countries. T-statistics from heteroskedasticity consistent
(Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses.
Dependent variable Ln (Tobin’s Q) ROA
Regression specification 1 2 3 4
Family 0.0481 0.0849 0.0099 0.0113
(2.16) (2.68) (2.66) (2.43)
Cash-flow rights −0.0003 0.0001
(−0.41) (1.21)
Wedge −0.0039 −0.0003
(−2.74) (−1.47)
Ln (Size) 0.0174 0.0199 0.0035 0.0042
(1.08) (1.36) (2.39) (2.43)
Leverage −0.0249 −0.0271 −0.0105 −0.0109
(−2.11) (−2.39) (−4.12) (−4.47)
Sales growth 0.1729 0.1698 0.0180 0.0178
(4.37) (4.22) (2.16) (2.14)
R-squared adj. 32.46% 33.09% 20.03% 20.40%
N. Observations 1852 1852 1852 1852
(family or not) and to the ownership structure chosen by the controlling shareholder
(share of cash-flow rights and separation between cash-flow and voting rights), then the
coefficient on the dummy variable, in this specification, captures both the ‘pure’ effect
of the type of controlling shareholder and the effect of the average ownership structure
chosen by that type.
In the second specification (columns 2 and 4), that we can define ‘net-of-the-
controlling-strategy’, we include the dummy-variable for family along with the two
continuous variables representing the share of cash-flow rights and the wedge between
the voting and the cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder. In this second
specification we can interpret the coefficient of the dummy as informative of the ‘pure’
effect of the type of control, i.e. the specific skills or disadvantages that could make
families different as controlling shareholders, separated from the effect of the ownership
structure (that is simultaneously estimated by assuming it is equal for family and non-
family firms).
The results in Table 4 show that in continental Europe family control goes together with
higher value and operating performance. In all the regressions, either with dependent
variable Q (regressions 1 and 2) or with dependent variable ROA (regressions 3 and
4), the coefficient on the dummy-variable ‘family’ is positive and highly statistically
significant). This result suggests that family control is beneficial both when we measure a
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‘pure family effect’ separated from an ‘ownership structure effect’ and when we measure
an ‘overall family effect’.
More in detail, in regressions 2 and 4 (net-of-the-controlling-strategy) the coefficients
on the family-dummies are positive and statistically significant both when the dependent
variable is Q (regression 2, statistical significance 1%) and when it is ROA (regression
4, statistical significance 5%). This means that, for any given combination of cash-
flow rights and wedge, family corporations tend to exhibit clearly better valuation and
operating performance than non-family firms.
However, although it cannot be said that separation of voting and cash-flow rights is
a necessary corollary of family control (in 43.1% of family-controlled corporations the
family holds an identical share of voting and cash-flow rights), family corporations do
resort more often to control-enhancing devices, and this makes their ownership structure
less efficient in terms of valuation and operating performance, as is shown by the negative
signs on the Wedge variable in regressions 2 and 4. Therefore, when we measure the
joint effect of family control and ownership structure, as we do in regressions 1 and 3,
the effect of family control actually turns out to be still positive, but smaller. Even in
this ‘gross-of-the-controlling-strategy’ specification, however, the positive family effect
is present and highly statistically significant (5% level for Q and 1% for ROA).
We have finally to mention that we run a regression specification (not reported in
the tables) in which we also include as independent variables the interaction terms
family∗cash-flow rights, and family∗wedge. The estimates for the interaction terms
are not significant when we employ ROA as the dependent variable. On the contrary,
they are significant when we employ Tobin’s Q, since the value of the family-dummy
becomes higher, and the regression line for both cash-flow rights and wedge is more
steeply downward sloping in the case of family-controlled corporations. On one side, this
suggests that the market is more diffident towards management-entrenching strategies
when they are put in place by family firms (a similar result is documented for Swedish
firms by Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). On the other side, this reinforces the evidence
of the positive properties of family control once we separate it from the effect of the
quantitative ownership variables.
A last remark about the results in Table 4 concerns the estimates for the cash-flow and
wedge variables. The general opinion of the relationship between value/performance and
these variables, based on papers by Claessens et al. (2002), Lins (2003) and Gompers
et al. (2004) – that regard respectively East Asia, various emerging markets, and the
USA – is that (i) valuation and performance increase in the cash-flow rights of the
largest ultimate shareholder and (ii) valuation and performance decrease in the wedge
between the voting and the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder. However, we find
practically no association with cash-flow rights as far as Q is concerned, and only weak
evidence for ROA (the positive coefficients on ROA are not statistically significant).
Results are more aligned with expectations for what regards the wedge variable, since
there is clear evidence of negative association with Q, and weak evidence of negative
association with ROA (the estimated coefficients are actually negative, though not
statistically significant). The reasons for the departure from the results found in other
economies about the relationship between value/performance and cash-flow rights12
cannot be investigated in this paper, but may be an interesting topic for further research.
12 A similar result is however found by Lins (2003) in a sample of 1433 firms from 18
emerging markets.
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B. The relation between firm performance and family involvement
Family control in general seems to have a positive effect, but what about different
types of family control? There is evidence, mainly from the USA, that the performance
of corporations run by their founders is actually above the average (McConnaughy
et al., 1998; Palia and Ravid, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Adams et al., 2004;
Fahlenbrach, 2005), but the same cannot be said when descendants take the reins
(McConnaughy et al., 1998; Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that outside managers can take into the corporation
skills and experiences that not only descendants, but sometimes also founders, may not
Table 5
The relationship between firm value and performance, and family involvement in
management
In this table we report results of OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA on proxy variables for the
involvement of the family in managing the corporations. In regressions in columns 1 and 3, we include
among regressors Cash-flow rights (share of cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder) and
Wedge (difference between the share of voting and cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder. In
panel A Family CEO takes value 1 for corporations in which the CEO is a member of the controlling
family. Family non-executive takes value 1 for corporations where the CEO is not a member of the
family, but at least one member sits on the board as non-executive director. Family not on the board
takes value 1 when no member of the family sits on the board. In panel B Founder takes value 1 when
the founder is still alive, Descendants takes value 1 in all other family-controlled corporations. In all
regressions we include as control variables (but do not report the results in the table): Ln (Size) (natural
logarithm of total assets), Leverage (book value of total financial debt divided by the book value of
equity), and Sales growth (growth of sales in the previous year). We then include the fixed effects
for SIC two-digits, years and country. T-statistics from heteroskedasticity consistent (Huber/White)
standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A: Family CEO vs. family non-executive
Dependent variable Ln (Tobin’s Q) ROA
Family CEO 0.0806 0.0532 0.0095 0.0091
(1.72) (1.34) (1.59) (1.78)
Family non-executive 0.1007 0.0603 0.0172 0.0154
(2.78) (2.29) (3.41) (3.95)
Family not on the board 0.0416 0.0026 −0.0051 −0.0075
(0.89) (0.07) (−0.63) (−1.05)
Cash-flow rights −0.0004 0.0001
(−0.48) (1.05)
Wedge −0.0039 −0.0003
(−2.53) (−1.29)
Ln (Size) 0.0202 0.0182 0.0043 0.0038
(1.36) (1.12) (2.48) (2.47)
Leverage −0.0276 −0.0257 −0.0111 −0.0107
(−2.46) (−2.23) (−4.35) (−4.04)
Sales growth 0.1683 0.1708 0.0173 0.0174
(4.21) (4.30) (2.11) (2.13)
R-squared adj 33.15% 32.54% 20.96% 20.63%
N. Observations 1852 1852 1852 1852
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Table 5
Continued.
Panel B: Founder vs. descendants
Dependent variable Ln (Tobin’s Q) ROA
Founder 0.1405 0.1164 0.0194 0.0192
(4.33) (4.02) (5.13) (4.54)
Descendants 0.0657 0.0239 0.0104 0.0082
(1.55) (0.75) (1.55) (1.49)
Cash-flow rights −0.0004 0.0001
(−0.52) (0.91)
Wedge −0.0037 −0.0003
(−2.33) (−1.41)
Ln (Size) 0.0211 0.0197 0.0043 0.0038
(1.48) (1.26) (2.31) (2.29)
Leverage −0.0290 −0.0277 −0.0112 −0.0109
(−2.47) (−2.29) (−4.52) (−4.28)
Sales growth 0.1672 0.1689 0.0176 0.0177
(4.14) (4.26) (2.16) (2.18)
R-squared adj. 33.34% 32.84% 20.74% 20.43%
N. Observations 1852 1852 1852 1852
have. In this case, the mere fact that the CEO is a member of the family should have
a negative effect on performance. Therefore, in the present section we turn to analyse
different cases of family control.
In Tables 5 and 6 we report results of regressions in which we include dummy-
variables representing the different types of family involvement. The regressions are
run on the whole sample, therefore the coefficients on dummy-variables inform us if
corporations characterised by a given type of family participation are different in their
average valuation and operating performance from non-family firms.
We seek evidence on the following points. First, we wish to understand the effect
of family control when a member of the controlling family is CEO of the company.
Second, we look at possible differences between family firms controlled by founders
and by descendants, following the mainly US evidence about superior performance of
founders. Third, we are particularly interested in the performance of family firms whose
CEO is a descendant, a case that is often seen as a negative outcome of family control,
since it is a priori likely that the descendants do not share the founder’s distinctive
entrepreneurial skills.
C.1 Family CEO vs. Family non-executive-directors. In Panel A of Table 5 we abstract
from the founder-descendants alternative, and simply analyse different degrees of
involvement of the family, by considering a first dummy-variable that takes the value
one when the CEO belongs to the family, a second dummy-variable that takes the value
one when the CEO is not a member of the family but at least one member of the family
sits on the board of directors, and a third dummy-variable for the case of no family
present on the board at all. The picture released by these regressions is clear; the general
positive effect of family control we already noticed can be split according to the degree
of involvement of families in management. The effect is confirmed to be clearly positive
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Table 6
The relationship between firm value and performance, and the involvement in management
of founders and descendendants
In this table we report results of OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA on proxy variables for the
involvement of founders and descendants in managing the corporations. In regressions in columns 1
and 3, we include among regressors Cash-flow rights (share of cash-flow rights held by the largest
shareholder) and Wedge (difference between the share of voting and cash-flow rights held by the
largest shareholder). Founder CEO represents when the founder is CEO, Founder non-executive when
the founder sits on the board as non-executive director, Founder not on the board when the founder is
still alive but no member of the family sits on the board. Descendants CEO, Descendant non-executive,
Descendant not on the board represent the equivalent situations for family controlled corporations in
which the founder passed away. In all regressions we include as control variables (but do not report the
results in the table): Ln (Size) (natural logarithm of total assets), Leverage (book value of total financial
debt divided by the book value of equity), and Sales growth (growth of sales in the previous year). We
then include the fixed effects for SIC two-digits, years and country. T-statistics from heteroskedasticity
consistent (Huber/White) standard errors appear in parentheses.
Dependent variable Ln (Tobin’s Q) ROA
Founder CEO 0.1338 0.1184 0.0137 0.0140
(3.67) (2.79) (2.52) (2.14)
Founder non-executive 0.1813 0.1597 0.0255 0.0250
(3.27) (2.92) (4.84) (4.38)
Founder not on the board −0.0197 −0.0569 0.0150 0.0129
(−0.23) (−0.87) (0.89) (0.91)
Descendant CEO 0.0453 0.0143 0.0110 0.0097
(0.59) (0.22) (1.19) (1.21)
Descendant non-executive 0.0808 0.0392 0.0149 0.0122
(2.22) (1.39) (2.31) (2.43)
Descendants not on the board 0.0285 −0.0089 −0.0033 −0.0063
(0.56) (−0.18) (−0.35) (−0.73)
Cash-flow rights −0.0003 0.0001
(−0.45) (0.74)
Wedge −0.0035 −0.0003
(−2.16) (−1.27)
Ln (Size) 0.0208 0.0196 0.0043 0.0039
(1.40) (1.21) (2.40) (2.46)
Leverage −0.0299 −0.0288 −0.0114 −0.0111
(−2.63) (−2.48) (−4.44) (−4.25)
Sales growth 0.1640 0.1648 0.0177 0.0177
(4.00) (4.08) (2.22) (2.23)
R-squared adj 33.57% 33.10% 21.02% 20.72%
N. Observations 1852 1852 1852 1852
when the family takes up the role of monitoring by assuming non-executive positions on
the board of directors, since the dummies for the presence on the board of non-executive
family members is positive and highly statistically significant (in Q regressions, once at
the 5% and the other at the 1% level; in ROA regressions, always at the 1% level). On
the other hand, when a family member takes the position of CEO, the evidence of the
better position of family vs. non family-firms becomes weaker. Notice that the size of the
estimates for the family-CEO dummies does not decline abruptly with respect to the size
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of the family-non-executive dummies. Rather what declines is statistical significance –
both for Q and ROA, the coefficient remains significant at the 10% level in one of the
two regressions – suggesting that there is a much larger variance in the market valuation
and operating performance of companies run by family-CEOs, coupled with slightly
lower average values, compared to companies that are simply monitored by families.
But this does not mean that family-CEO firms are worse off than non-family firms,
since the regression in the first column of Panel A Table 5 shows that Q is 8.4 % higher
in family-CEO firms, and the one in the third column shows that the coefficient on the
family-CEO dummy is equal to 14% of the overall mean ROA.
Finally, note that the results of Panel A Table 5 do not suggest that family firms
perform better the less the family takes interest in the company. It is true that it seems
better when the family does not manage and limits itself to monitoring; but the group
of worst-performing family firms are those in which the family does not manage and
stays outside of the board. For this group there is no sign of better performance with
respect to non-family firms, and there could even be worse performance, as is suggested
by the (not statistically significant) negative sign of the coefficients when ROA is the
dependent variable. This is consistent with the idea that family control is beneficial for
the firm when coupled with some degree of involvement of the family.13
C.2. Founders vs. descendants. In Panel B of Table 5, we consider a different grouping
criterion of family firms, that distinguishes them into two types, those controlled by
the founder and those controlled by descendants. The criterion states simply that, if the
founder is still alive – no matter her role in the firm, if any – the family-controlled firm
is considered a founder-firm, otherwise it is considered a descendant-firm.
The results are clear and statistically strong, showing that family firms perform much
better when they are still controlled by their founders. The size of the difference
in founder-firm average valuation and operating performance with respect to both
descendant-controlled and non-family corporations is impressive. If we compare the size
of the point-estimates, we note that founder-controlled corporations
′
average Tobin’s Q
is 12.3% higher than in non-family firms, and their ROA is 28.2% higher than the overall
mean (gross-of-the-controlling-strategy specification).
Although a similarly large overperformance of founder-led corporations is found in
the USA too (see Adams et al., 2004), we consider the hypothesis that this strong result
is due to the omission of control variables representing age since foundation or since
IPO. When we run regressions on the sub-samples formed by the corporations for which
these data are available, including age-foundation and/or age-IPO as control variables,
the results for the founder dummy-variable are nearly unchanged. We interpret this as
evidence that the founder effect is distinct from a young-firm effect.14
13 We also test whether the coefficients of the three dummy variables are statistically different
one from the other. This is true when we compare the dummies for family-CEO and family-
non-executive with the dummy for family-not-on-the board, in regressions in which ROA is
the dependent variable.
14 Only 20% of the 264 family corporations whose IPO took place after 1988, and 30% of
the 65 corporations founded after 1978, are still run by their founder. Therefore, we can
effectively measure the distinct effects of the age and of the presence of the founder. The
coefficient on the age variable is always positive, that means that younger corporations, in
term of foundation date or IPO date, do actually perform better. However, the size and the
statistical significance of the founder dummy-variable are nearly unchanged.
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It is thus clear that founder-corporations perform significantly better than
descendants-corporations.15 However, descendants-corporations are no worse than non-
family firms, as the positive sign of coefficients on the dummy-variable descendants
show. Tobin’s Q is 6.6% higher than in non-family firms in the net specification, and
2.4% in the gross one; ROA is higher than the overall mean by, respectively, 15.3% and
12.0%. But, although sizeable – especially in the case of ROA – these point-estimates
are never accompanied by statistical significance, so that we cannot reliably say that
descendant-firms are better than non-family ones.
C.3. Founders and descendants, and their involvement in the family company. Previous
research has highlighted negative performance of family firms where a descendant
assumes the role of CEO. This result has intuitive appeal. While exchange listed
companies that have been brought to market by founders are likely to have been run
by skilled entrepreneurs, there is no reason to suppose that heirs inherit the managerial
skills of founders. Thus, the decision to keep the CEO position in the family can simply
mean that a selection of the best candidates for the position has not been put in place,
in view of the advantages of enjoying the private benefits of this position in the family.
In Table 6, therefore, we present a finer partition of the family involvement in
management, by considering both the founder/descendants alternative and the different
roles on the board. Thus, we include in the regression six dummy-variables representing
different groups of family-firms:
1 Founder CEO = family-controlled firm in which the founder is CEO (often also
chairman);
2 Founder non-executive = family-controlled firm in which the founder sits on the
board as non-executive (often is non-executive chairman);
3 Founder not on the board = family-controlled firm in which the founder is still alive
but neither the founder nor any other family member sits on the board;
4 Descendant CEO = family-controlled firm, family in the second or later generation,
CEO belonging to the family;
5 Descendant non-executive = family-controlled firm, family in the second or later
generation, member of the family on the board as non-executive;
6 Descendant not on the board = family-controlled firm, family in the second or later
generation, no member of the family on the board.
The neatest result in Table 6 is that the statistically significant positive difference
between founder-firms and non-family firms – that we already noticed while comment-
ing on Table 5 – holds both when the founder is CEO and when she is non-executive.
However, it is noticeable that both founder and descendant firms seem to be better
off when the CEO is from outside the family. While the result for descendants could
be expected, it was not a foregone conclusion that founder-firms, that on average are
already more profitable than the others, perform even better when not all managerial
power is kept within the family.
As far as the comparison between descendant-firms and non-family firms is con-
cerned, results in Table 6 trace a more interesting picture than in Table 5, where we
could notice no statistical difference between the two groups. The interesting evidence
15 The dummy for founder is statistically different from the dummy for descendants in
regressions in which Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable.
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arises from the separation between descendant-CEO and descendant-non-executive
firms. There is rather strong statistical evidence that descendant-non-executive firms
perform better than non-family firms.16 Descendant-CEO firms, on the contrary, are not
statistically different from non-family firms. However, there is no suggestion, contrary
to what is found in non-European papers, that descendant-CEO firms are inferior to
non-family firms in terms of market valuation or operating performance, as is shown by
the fact that the estimates of the descendant-CEO dummies are always positive, albeit
not statistically significant. The only negative signs appear for the dummy-variables of
family not in the board, confirming that the absence of the family from both management
and monitoring is really the most critical case for family control.
Coming back to the better performance of all family-firms when the CEO is an
outsider, a more detailed look reveals that the estimates concerning market valuation
(Tobin’s Q) for founder-CEO and founder-non-executive are rather close, and both of
them quite large compared to the estimates for descendant-CEO and descendant-non-
executive. When we consider instead operating performance (ROA), we notice that the
estimate for the founder-non-executive dummy takes a clearly larger value, and that
the value taken by the founder-CEO dummy is even slightly lower – at least in the net
regression (third column) – than that of the descendant-non-executive. In some sense,
the market valuation of family firms seems to be affected by more confidence on the
value added by a founder-CEO than what would be justified on the basis of operating
performance.
A similar but opposite observation can be made when we consider the difference
between descendant-CEO and descendant-non-executive firms. In this instance, we find
that the difference in market valuation in favour of descendant-non-executive is larger
than what seems implied by the difference in operating performance, so that the market
seems suspicious of a descendant-CEO beyond what should be the case on the basis of
accounting profits.
5. Further Analysis and Discussion of the Statistical Evidence
A. Sample selection effects
We consider the possibility that some results are driven by the sample selection
criteria we adopt, that were explained in Section 2. Along with common criteria (we
exclude financial firms and regulated utilities), we require for inclusion total assets
(accounting value of equity plus net financial debt) larger than €300 million in 1999.
We check therefore for the possibility that the latter criterion makes us pick successful
companies that recently showed more than average growth, thereby artificially selecting
observations with higher Tobin’s Q and ROA, that could lead to an unknown bias in the
comparison between family and non-family firms, and across different types of family
companies.
16 In ROA regressions the dummy for this case is positive and statistically significant far
beyond the 5% threshold, while the dummy for the descendant-CEO case takes a smaller
value and is not statistically significant. The dummy for descendant-non-executive is also
positive and statistically significant in the net specification of the regression when Q is the
dependent variable; it is not in the gross specification, due to the important value-discount
arising from the diffuse presence of control-enhancing devices in descendant-firms (that was
clearly visible in Panel C of Table 3).
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Table 8
Average ROA and Tobin’s Q for different size classes
In this table we present the mean and the median ROA and Tobin’s Q for continental European non-
financial and non-regulated corporations in the Worldscope database in 1999. Corporations are divided
into three classes. In the first we include corporations with a book value of balance sheet Total assets
larger than €300 million. This size class corresponds to the size class of companies examined in the
paper. The other two classes correspond to smaller corporations, that are excluded from the sample
we study.
Tobin’s Q ROA
Sample Number % Mean Median Mean Median
Total assets value < 100 1212 46 2.69 1.73 4.82% 6.06%
Total assets value (100 - 300) 566 22 2.05 1.42 7.42% 7.24%
Total assets value > 300 853 32 1.99 1.38 6.22% 5.99%
To consider it, we observe that in Worldscope, for the 11 countries, the total number
of non-financial and non-regulated corporations with accounting and market price data
is 2,631 in the base year 1999. In Table 7 we report their distribution across countries,
distinguishing the number of companies with (a) asset size more than €300 million, (b)
asset size between €100 and 300 million, (c) asset size less than €100 million. The pool
from which we draw17 comprises one third of the total number of firms. The largest
group is the one with the smallest firms (46% of the total), while the mid-sized firms
amount to less than one quarter of the total.
We then consider the measure of Tobin’s Q and ROA for all the 2,631 companies, and
obtain the results that are summarised in Table 8. It is easy to notice that, on average,
firms with total assets below $300 million that are excluded from our sample, exhibit
higher valuation, and, except in the case of the smallest companies, higher profitability
than firms that are included. This suggests that our selection criteria did not produce a
bias towards inclusion of more successful companies.
B. Pooled (average) regressions
To check the robustness of the results presented in the previous sections, we run
pooled (average) regressions (Table 9) in order to minimise, when performing non-
OLS regressions, the problem of correlation across residuals that is solved in OLS
through the Hubert-White standard error estimation procedure. In Table 9 we report the
results of: (i) random-effect regressions in which we introduce a country random-effect
in place of country fixed-effects; (ii) robust regressions, in which a robust weighting
function substitutes the winsorisation procedure employed in OLS regressions (and in
random-effect pooled regressions too).18
17 In that we arrive at 675 out of 853 companies larger than €300 million after dropping,
as we explained in Section 2.A, limited partnerships, dual class corporations in which only
one class is publicly traded, and companies in which more than 95% of the share capital is
held by the largest shareholder.
18 We use the robust regression Biweight estimator, that belongs to the class of estimators
known as M-estimators of location, and works by minimising a function of the deviations of
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Overall, the results of pooled regressions confirm the picture suggested by OLS
regressions. Results are very similar for what concerns robust regressions (Panel B),
both in terms of the estimated value of coefficients and of statistical significance. They
are also similar in random-effect regressions, though statistical significance is lower.
In gross specifications of random-effect regressions (Panel A, columns 2, 4, 6, 8) the
signs of coefficients are fully consistent with the results of OLS and robust regressions
while statistical significance is reached only for the founder-non-executive dummy, but
in the net specifications (Panel B, columns 1, 3, 5, 7) we obtain both the same signs
and the achievement of statistical significance as in alternative regression techniques.
In conclusion, the results of pooled regressions support the evidence presented in the
previous sections.
C. On the endogeneity of ownership variables and firm performance
Possible endogeneity problems in the regressions results have to be considered. In its
simplest form, a problem of endogeneity might arise if firm performance caused choices
about the share of cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder. This could happen if
under- or over-valuation prompted adjustments in the stakes of controlling shareholders,
who could take advantage of private information about the true value of corporations.
There could be however other more elaborate reasons for endogeneity. Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that both firm performance and
managerial ownership may be endogenously determined by unobserved characteristics
in the firm’s contracting environment. Endogeneity arguments could also apply to the
relation between performance and family control (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Heiss and
Ko¨ke, 2004), and to the relation between performance and CEO-founder persistence
(Adams et al., 2004).
Therefore, we test the robustness of our results by employing linear instrumental
variable regressions, in which the ownership variables representing the cash-flow rights
of the first shareholder, the wedge between its voting and cash-flow rights, and the
occurrence of family control, are estimated using instrumental variables. As instrumental
each observation from the estimate of location (Huber, 1981). Least squares estimates are
very sensitive to contaminated observations and sometimes outliers cannot be detected by
looking at residuals, since they affect the estimator in such a way that outlier diagnostics are
no longer able to discover them. M-estimators may be used to address this inconvenience,
though these estimators are not robust with respect to leverage points (i.e. outliers in the
space of the covariates). We used this procedure because in our dataset the main source of
bias comes from contamination in the error term (vertical outliers) and not in the explanatory
variables (leverage points).
The procedure used consist of the following steps:
1. Estimate the residuals from OLS regression;
2. Identify deviant cases by comparing residuals with the MAD (Median Absolute Deviation)
estimates, and find the weights according to Hubert or Biweight methodologies;
3. Perform a robust regression using weighted least squares;
4. Estimate the residuals from WLS and continue iteratively with step 2), until weights
converge (usually within 10 iterations).
The Biweight procedure downweighs outlying data points more than the Huber methodology.
Results from this last weighing function, not presented in the paper, are however similar to
the Biweight estimates.
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variables we employ the alpha of the ordinary share, its volatility,19 and the age of
the corporation (log of). To avoid the potential problem of ‘weak instruments’ (Stock
et al., 2002) due to the modest correlation between the endogenous variables and our
instruments, we employ LIML estimates (Anderson et al., 1982) instead of traditional
2SLS methods.
The results in Table 10 show that after controlling for endogeneity Tobin’s Q is still
negatively correlated with the wedge between voting and cash-flow rights and positively
correlated with family control. Moreover, the positive effect of the presence of the
founder – both as CEO and as non-executive – is still highly significant, and the effect
of ‘descendant-non-executive’ is also positive and significant (10% level).
When the dependent variable is ROA, the results are qualitatively similar to those
of simple regression analysis, but are generally lacking in statistical significance, since
only the presence of descendants as non-executives seems to exert a clear positive effect
on performance.
The final conclusion about the endogeneity issue is thus clouded by the results of
regressions of operating performance. Overall, however, we think there are no clear
suggestions that the evidence provided by the OLS results is driven by endogeneity in
the variables we employ.
D. Results by country
Obviously it is interesting to see how much the effect of family control, that up to now
we considered for the continental European area as a whole, holds at the single-country
level. To do this, we run regressions on the sample of 675 firms similar to those in
Tables 4, 5 and 6, except that we substitute to each family-dummy of interest a set
of family-dummy variables, one for each country, while maintaining the regressions
identical for all the rest. Some results are summarised in Table 11, where we report
the sign of coefficients of these ‘family∗country’ dummy variables for two selected
regressions. The signs we report, together with their statistical significance, immediately
tell us whether in the single country the family-effect of interest is positive or not.20
In Table 11, countries are ordered according to the origin of their legal system, so we
present first the five ‘French-origin’ countries (Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Spain), then the two ‘German-origin’ (Germany and Switzerland), and finally the
four ‘Scandinavian-origin’ (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). This allows us to
highlight the fact that, if we look at the percentage of family firms in which the CEO
position is held by a member of the family, we can see (line added at the bottom of
Panel A) a tendency to find more family-CEOs in (legal) French-origin countries than
in German-origin and, to a clearer extent, in Scandinavian-origin ones. We notice, in
19 Volatility is the stock return variance, estimated over 40 months prior to each year-end;
alpha is estimated by regressing 40 months of returns in excess on treasury bills on the
excess returns of an index representative of the country stock market.
20 We also run separate regressions by country, that yield similar results. However, the
regressions we comment upon exploit more efficiently the information embedded in the
whole sample. For instance, in countries for which we have a small number of observations,
the industry fixed-effect tends to become, in practice, a firm fixed-effect.
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particular, that firms in which the CEO is a descendant are concentrated in France and
Italy, given that in these two countries we find 35 cases out of 55 for the whole sample.
In French-origin countries it is also uncommon for no family member to sit on the board.
The regression results in Table 11 are in line with those we commented upon when
we considered the family effect in continental Europe as a whole, in the sense that the
relevant results are actually widespread across countries.
When we look at the regressions in which the simple family-control dummy variable
is considered (first line of Panel A and B), we note that in 8 out of 11 countries it always
takes a positive sign, as it does in the whole sample (see Table 4). In just two countries
– Italy and Denmark – the family effect seems to be negative in both Panels A and B, so
that for them we find an unequivocal suggestion that family control negatively affects
both market valuation and operating performance. For Switzerland, the effect is positive
for market valuation and negative for operating performance, while the reverse is true
for Norway.
We then show the results of the regressions in which we split the family effect
along both the founder/descendant and the CEO/non-executive dimensions. It is clearly
appropriate to be cautious in considering the results of this regression, given that in
many countries there are a small number of companies for each case. However, also
in this regression, the results at the country level are in line with the evidence for
the whole of Europe. The evidence of Tables 5 and 6 showed that there is a large
positive effect when the founder is present; and actually the coefficient on the founder-
CEO dummy is positive in 7 countries out of 8 (not 11 because there is no founder
CEO in Sweden, Denmark and Finland) and the coefficient on founder-non-executive
is positive in 8 out of 10 (no founder non-executive in Denmark), both when Tobin’s Q
and when ROA are the independent variable. The evidence of Table 6 then showed that
descendant-non-executive firms exhibit better performance than non-family firms, while
descendant-CEO firms do not, and actually, in 8 countries out of 11, the descendant-non-
executive effect is positive for both market valuation and operating performance, while
the descendant-CEO effect is positive in only 6 out of 10 countries (no descendant-CEO
in Sweden) for market valuation, and in 5 out of 10 for operating performance. Finally,
the evidence of Table 6 showed that the case in which members of the family do not sit
on the board is the relatively worse case for family firms, and this is confirmed clearly
at least by market valuation.
6. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have highlighted the link existing in continental Europe between corpo-
rate performance and ownership structure. European corporations exhibit concentrated
ownership structures, a relevant degree of separation between control and cash-flow
rights, and widespread diffusion of family control. Family control is clearly associated
with the control-enhancing devices that allow separation between control and cash-flow
rights.
However, regression analysis of the link between corporate valuation and ownership
structure shows that, notwithstanding the negative effect of the more frequent recourse
to control-enhancing devices, family control is positive for European corporations. It is
highly positive at the founder stage – provided the founder still exerts an active role as
CEO or non-executive director – much in the same way as it is in the USA. The different
result with respect to the USA, is that the family effect continues to be positive at the
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descendants stage – when descendants limit themselves to non-executives roles – or at
least non-negative – when descendants assume the role of CEO. Only when the family
is not represented on the board do family-controlled firms seem to perform worse than
non-family firms.
We confirm non-European results about the negative effect of control-enhancing
devices. However, we show that although control-enhancing devices are associated
throughout the world with family control, this does not per se permit the jump to
the conclusion of a negative effect of the latter. Outside of the USA, the UK and a few
other countries, the majority of listed non-financial corporations are family-controlled,
and it is important to reach conclusions about the desirability of this type of control. The
continental European evidence tells us that, notwithstanding the frequent preference of
family corporations for apparently inefficient ownership structures, the general effect
of family control may still be positive.
Finally, our findings suggest an empirical argument of caution – adding to several
theoretically-founded points that have been deployed (Berglof and Burkart, 2003) –
towards the usefulness of a regulation aiming to prohibit separation of control and cash-
flow rights, of the kind that is currently being debated at the EC level. It is true that
separation per se is associated with lower performance. However, separation may have
in a number of cases a role in allowing control of subjects who are better able to manage
or monitor corporations, whose beneficial skills may more than outweigh the costs of
an inefficient ownership structure. Therefore, it is not clear that an abrupt dissolution
of existing controlling equilibria would lead to a more efficient European corporate
sector.
Appendix A : Data sources
For all countries: Worldscope and Extel (Thomson financial); Osiris (Bureau Van Dijck);
corporations’ websites; news searched on Lexis-Nexis and the world wide web (Google
search engine).
Belgium Euronext (www.euronext.com); L’Echo (www.lecho.be).
Denmark Copenhagen Stock Exchange (www.cse.dk).
France AMF (www.amf-france.org), Euronext (www.euronext.com).
Germany Wer gehoert zu wem (Commerzbank), Onvista (www.onvista.de).
Italy CONSOB (www.consob.it), Il taccuino dell’azionista (Il Sole 24 Ore
Libri)
The Netherlands Euronext (www.euronext.com); Elsevier Ondernemings Rapport
(available on Lexis-Nexis).
Spain CNMV (www.cnmv.es).
Switzerland Bilanz on line (www.aktienfuehrer.ch); Guide des Actions suisses
(Verlag Finanz und Wirtschaft).
For Finland, Norway and Sweden we do not rely on specific national data sources.
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